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Abstract
I explore cross-sectional portfolio performance in a sample containing 324,736 trans-
actions conducted by 16,831 investors at an Internet discount brokerage ﬁrm during
the period May 1999 to March 2002. On average, investors hold undiversiﬁed portfo-
lios, show a strong preference for risk, and trade aggressively. I measure performance
using a panel data model, and explain the cross-sectional variation using investors’
turnover, portfolio size and degree of diversiﬁcation. I ﬁnd that turnover is harmful
to performance due to fees, and is therefore more predominant among investors with
small portfolios. It is argued that the degree of diversiﬁcation is a proxy for investor
skill, and it has a separate and distinct positive effect on performance. These ﬁndings
are helpful in explaining the overall result that investors underperform the market by
around 8.5% per year on average.
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The stock market boom of the late 1990s is, by most standards, unprecedented in stock
market history. Even if many companies in traditional industries were valued at histor-
ical highs, the market was given an extra boost by sky rocketing prices stemming from
the newly emerging information technology sector. Interest in the stock market surged.
A new category of ﬁnancial intermediaries, namely online brokers, provided low-cost
stock market access that was mainly aimed at small investors. The Stockholm Stock Ex-
change reports that, in 1997, these companies accounted for 1% of the value and 3% of the
transactions on the exchange. By 2000, this had risen to 4% of the value and 18% of the
transactions. These aggregate ﬁgures suggest that online brokers have attracted a clien-
tele of small investors that trade actively. In March 2000 the market peaked, and then
entered into a bear market that was to become one of the worst ever. These turbulent
times provide the data for this study on the investor performance of a group of online
traders.
This paper aims to quantify and measure the relative effects on performance of invest-
ment behavior. Since online investing is fairly new, there exists little previous research
on the performance of online traders, even though they are predicted to grow in number
(see Barber and Odean, 2001b for a survey). Online investors are well suited for studying
individual investor behavior, since intermediation between the broker and the investor is
kept at a minimum. Individual investors are also more likely to suffer from behavioral
biases than investment professionals; overconﬁdent investors are likely to trade more
vigorously and hold undiversiﬁed portfolios.
The data were made available by an online broker and cover all transactions since the
start in May 1999 up to and including March 2002. The 324,736 transactions in common
stocks are distributed over 16,831 investors who enter sequentially. The investors are, on
average, relatively young, predominantly male, and aggressive traders.
The average turnover rate implies that investors buy and sell their portfolio more than
twice a year. The 20% that trade the most turn their portfolios around about seven times
a year. In addition, investors are not well diversiﬁed. The median number of stocks in
the portfolio is two, and 18% of the investors hold only one stock.
The investors in this sample show a preference for risk in general, and technology
stocks in particular. The average beta is above 1.4, and among the investors who only
hold one stock, 80% choose a stock belonging to the technology industry. In contrast,
among the investors who hold four or more stocks, the average technology sector weight
is only 55%. Diversiﬁcation is therefore not only related to idiosyncratic risk, but to in-
dustry selection as well. Furthermore, I ﬁnd evidence that investors who are more highly
diversiﬁed systematically hold stocks that perform better within industries on average.
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This effect remains when accounting for differences in portfolio risk and size, and sug-
gests that investment skill is related to the degree of diversiﬁcation.
I propose a method for retrieving individual, monthly portfolio returns directly from
transaction data that is new to the literature of individual investor performance. Portfolio
returns are measured relative to passive returns, which are the returns of the portfolio
investors held at the beginning of the month, and therefore exclude monthly trading. It is
found that most of what is lost due to trading can be related to fees, or 32 basis points per
month compared with a total of 37. Investors in the top trading quintile lose around 95
basis points per month compared with those who do not trade. This result, however, is
primarily driven by investors with small portfolios who are more sensitive to ﬁxed fees.
The average investor spends around 3.8% per year of their portfolio wealth on fees; this
is more than twice the charge of a standard mutual fund.
Figure 1A shows that the equally-weighted mean of the market-adjusted return is
-2.07% per month. In this paper I show how to decompose the return into the three parts
discussed: the component due to the choice of industry, intra-industry selection—“stock-
picking,” and trading.
The choice of industry is most important in explaining the return difference to the
market, reﬂecting the heavy tilt toward technology stocks and bad market timing. This
may simply reﬂect investors’ preferences for high risk. Risk is likely to be less of a prob-
lem when measuring stock-picking ability. The investors lose 43 basis points per month
from choosing stocks that underperform any given industry on average. Trading costs
are roughly equally important; 37 basis points per month are lost compared with the pas-
sive portfolio held at the beginning of the month. The value-weighted return suggests
that fees, in small transactions and for small portfolio sizes, drive this result.
In addition to the uni-dimensional effects of trading and stock selection documented
above, the main contribution of this paper lies in quantifying the relative importance of
these characteristics for investor performance taken together.
Figure 1B shows the frequency distribution of investors’ average performance, gener-
ated from estimates in a panel regression. The average performance here is a function of
investors’ turnover, size of portfolio and number of stocks held. It is possible to gener-
ate quite substantial cross-sectional variation in abnormal performance from the data by
using these characteristics. The average underperformance is 74 basis points (or around
8.5% in annualized terms). The poor performance is likely to be due to the fact that these
investors’ portfolios are too small, that they trade too much and are less experienced on aver-
age compared with other stock market participants. An additional percentage increase in
turnover hurts investor performance by 1.7 basis points per month. Investors whose port-
folio values are twice as high as the sample average gain an additional 11 basis points.
Similarly, investors who hold one stock more than average, i.e., four rather than three,
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Figure 1: Summary of key results
Figure 1A depicts the equally and value-weighted mean of a decomposition of the monthly market-adjusted return. The bar labelled
“Choice of industry” refers to the return difference between the market and the chosen industry. “Stock-picking” measures the
deviation from the individual stocks selected and the industry benchmark. “Trading” measures the return difference between the
portfolio that includes trading and the portfolio held at the beginning of the month. Figure 1B displays a histogram of the 16,831
investors’ monthly abnormal performance generated by the coefﬁcient estimates of panel regression Model V in Table 8.
























































perform 7 basis points better. The characteristics are also related to risk; investors that are
older, women, trade more, and are more diversiﬁed all take less systematic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
foundations of trading and stock selection, as well as the previous empirical evidence,
within the framework of individual investor behavior. Section 3 presents the transaction
data. Section 4 begins by explaining how portfolio returns are retrieved from transactions
and then presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Trading and stock selection
This paper links individual investor performance to both trading behavior and portfolio
strategies. Explaining the ﬁndings by rational behavior is not unproblematic, given the
overall poor performance of investors’ portfolios.
The ﬁrst question that arises is: Why do these individuals trade in such vast quan-
tities? The no-trade theorem states that prices fully reﬂect information and when new
information arrives, it is immediately incorporated into prices. If this were the case, there
would be no trading at all.
But there may be informational asymmetries that drive trading. Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) derive an equilibrium from when the marginal beneﬁts and costs of trading equate.
Varian (1989) shows that trading can occur if investors have different priors of a risky
assets mean. While this may explain why trading occurs, it offers little explanation as
to what drives the priors. If differences in information drive trading, we would expect
to see such investors compensated for the cost. The available evidence from individual
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investors in fact suggests the opposite: trading erodes returns. Heaton and Lucas (1996)
propose that individuals trade in ﬁnancial assets to buffer idiosyncratic income shocks
in order to smooth consumption over time. Even if this provides another fully rational
explanation for trading, it is difﬁcult to see why this insurance should be valued at such
high transaction costs. Investors could instead trade in mutual funds at a much lower
cost.
The trading behavior of individual investors has often been attributed to overcon-
ﬁdence, as proposed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Kyle and
Wang (1997), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), among others. In the psy-
chologyliterature, overconﬁdenceservesasalabel—atleastfromatheoreticalviewpoint—
of two broad classes of cognitive biases.
The ﬁrst, and most common, deﬁnition of overconﬁdence is the tendency for indi-
viduals to understate the uncertainty regarding their own estimates. When experimental
subjects are asked to form conﬁdence bounds around their point estimates, the outcome
typically falls outside of the bound much more often than expected if people were well
calibrated. This phenomenon is found to be task dependent, meaning that the evidence
is strongest in tasks that subjects ﬁnd difﬁcult.1
The second manifestation of overconﬁdence is that people are unrealistically opti-
mistic about their own ability. In a classic survey among students, Svensson (1981) ﬁnds
that 82% rank themselves to be among the 30% of drivers with the highest driving safety.
Such a belief can be linked to the concept of priors mentioned above, because it implies
that individuals may overstate the signiﬁcance of the information they may acquire. Fur-
thermore, Langer and Roth (1975) ﬁnd that individuals tend to ascribe success to their
own ability and failure to bad luck. Such an illusion of control is therefore closely related
to overconﬁdence.
In ﬁnancial models, overconﬁdent investors are those who hold unrealistic beliefs of
how high their returns will be and how precisely these can be estimated. It is reasonable
to believe that overconﬁdence may be more prevalent among individual investors, since
money management is regarded as a difﬁcult task for most people. In addition, feedback
in terms of relative performance is very noisy, and therefore the ability to learn from be-
havior is low. In the previous literature, overconﬁdence has primarily been associated
with excessive trading, but in principle, it could also lead to a lack of diversiﬁcation.
Investors overestimating the signiﬁcance of the information they obtain regarding a par-
ticular stock may feel that investing in this stock is more attractive than investing in a
more diversiﬁed portfolio.
In the previous literature on individual investor performance, Schlarbaum, Lewellen,
and Lease (1978) match purchases to sales and ﬁnd that a round-trip transaction costs
1For a review of these results, see McClelland and Bolger (1994).
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around 3.5% in commissions. Investors in their sample more than compensate for this
cost in their trading. These results have been contested by Barber and Odean (2000), who
point out that if investors are more likely to realize gains than losses, this methodology is
likely to produce overly favorable estimates of investor returns.2
Barber and Odean (2000), in contrast, measure returns from position statements, im-
plicitly assuming that all trades are conducted at the end of the month, and estimate
trading costs separately. They ﬁnd that the average round-trip trade costs approximately
3% in commissions and 1% on the bid-ask spread for a round-trip transaction. An ag-
gregated portfolio consisting of the top quintile of active traders loses as much as 6.5%
annually compared to the market due to these costs.
A related result by Barber and Odean (2002) is that online investors signiﬁcantly un-
derperform a size-matched sample of investors who did not go online. They ﬁnd that
young men with high portfolio turnover are more likely to go online—and once they
do—trade even more. They attribute this ﬁnding to three factors. First, it is argued that
men are more overconﬁdent than women, and will therefore be more likely to switch
to online trading. Second, there is an illusion of control; in other words, investors who
go online falsely perceive risk to be lower when they are able to monitor their portfolio
instantly. Third, they propose that another psychological concept—cognitive dissonance—
can reinforce trading activity. Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals rationalize
a behavior on the basis of prior beliefs. If the belief is that high performance is associated
with intense trading activity and constant monitoring of the portfolio, it is precisely this
behavior that such individuals will show.
Glaser and Weber (2003) conduct a survey among investors at an online broker, and
are therefore able to test directly how different measures of overconﬁdence relate to trad-
ing volume. They ﬁnd evidence that trading volume is related to the second manifesta-
tion of overconﬁdence, rather than the ﬁrst: investors who believe they are above average
trade more.
Overconﬁdence can explain trading behavior and lack of diversiﬁcation, but not which
stocks investors choose to buy. To gain a better understanding of investment strategies,
we borrow a different concept from the psychology literature, namely the availability
heuristic. Individuals have a clear tendency to underestimate risks when the context
is familiar or available. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1982) ﬁnd that individuals
underestimate by far the risk of dying of common diseases, but overestimate the risk of
rare and dramatic accidents. Even if accidents are rare, they attract much more attention
when they occur. It is thus easy to attribute too much weight to such casual observations.
Odean (1999) reports that investors, on average, sell stocks that outperform those they
2This argument relies on the ﬁndings of Shefrin and Statman (1985), Weber and Camerer (1998), and
Odean (1998) that investors hold on to the losers and sell the winners in their portfolios.
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buy at a cost of around 3% per year. This cannot easily be explained by overconﬁdence,
but is attributed to investors following naive investment strategies. Barber and Odean
(2003) argue that people’s buying behavior of stocks is subject to an availability bias, as
stocks bought are more likely to have had an extreme return performance (positive and
negative) or have had high media coverage. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggest another
form of availability bias when choosing among mutual funds: the 1/n-heuristic. They ﬁnd
that the number of funds available for selection determines the allocation, with investors
naively splitting their investments in equal proportions across the funds. These examples
provide evidence of systematic effects on buying behavior and should therefore be added
to the previous evidence on the reluctance to sell losers.
It is still not clear in what ways naive strategies erode performance, unless they are
negatively correlated with return patterns. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) ﬁnd that the
degree of sophistication matters for performance. They argue that households are likely
to be less sophisticated investors and ﬁnd that they trade to the opposite of investment
professionals, such as institutions. In their sample, households act contrarian, and on
average, lose from having such a strategy.
From the results cited here, it is tempting to generalize about private investors, who as
Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2003) put it; “are often regarded as at best uninformed,
at worst fools.” However, they do ﬁnd persistence in the performance of the top ten per-
cent of most successful traders. This serves as an important reminder that not all private
investors perform poorly, even if many do.
3 Data
Animportantadvantageofstudyinganonlinebrokeristhattheordersareplaceddirectly
by the investors. Although it is possible to place orders over the telephone as well, this
constitutes a very small part of the transactions. There is therefore little direct interaction
between the investor and the broker, which could otherwise be a source of concern when
making inferences about performance across various investor groups. A drawback is that
such investors cannot be regarded as being representative of any other group than online
investors in general. As low fees are the main form of competition for online brokers
when attracting customers, active traders are likely to be self-selected.
There are no tax exemptions for any accounts, as there are for the Keogh or 401(k)
scheme in the U.S., where taxes are deferred. Furthermore, Swedish tax rules do not
distinguish between the holding period of stocks, as is common in many countries. The
tax rate is a ﬂat 30% rate for the net of all realized gains and losses for private investors.
It is therefore possible to aggregate all portfolio holdings across individuals, even if they
in some cases possess more than one account.
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The transaction ﬁle includes all trades in common Swedish stock for all customers
at an Internet brokerage ﬁrm from the time it was established. The data stretches from
mid-April 1999 until the end of March 2002, or 35 calendar months.3 This ﬁle contains
transaction prices, volumes and fees for each traded stock, as well as an individual iden-
tiﬁcation tag that shows account number, age and gender for each trade. In addition,
data are collected on closing prices for 521 distinct stock ticker names corresponding to
the transaction ﬁle.4
From the original sample of 340,612 transactions distributed over 20,799 investors, I
make the following exclusions: Accounts owned by minors, those under the age of 18 in
the ﬁrst year of trading, are excluded as it is unclear if they are independently managed.
Portfolios worth less than or equal to SEK 1,000 in the ﬁrst month are excluded, since
apart from their being small, there is also very little trading in these portfolios. These
small portfolios are not likely to be important for the investor, and the very fact that
they are not traded may indicate that they are also judged by the investor as being too
small. Finally, I exclude investors that trade but never owned a portfolio at month-end
in the sample for selectivity reasons. An investor enters the sample by either buying
or depositing stocks. When categorizing investors by trading activity, the ﬁrst month is
excluded if there were no deposits, because it may not be representative of how active
the trader is.5 By excluding these observations, we obtain a sample which is hereafter
referred to as non-entering observations.
The fact that investors enter sequentially is displayed by Figure 2, along with the price
level of a value-weighted Swedish stock index. There were 900 investors active in the
sample at the end of 1999. By the end of 2000, the number of investors had grown to
11,261 and by 2001 they were 12,569. At most, which was in the last month of the sample,
there were 13,917 investors active at the same time. Even if the pace at which investors
entered is interesting in itself, it is not possible to know if they were new in the stock
market or if they were experienced traders that switch between brokers.
There are 2,914 investors leaving before the sample period ends, but the attrition rate
isrelativelystablearoundthemeanof1.4%permonth.6 Thisisroughlyfourtimesashigh
as that found by Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Ross (1992) in a sample of U.S. mutual
funds. Odean (1999) analyzes active accounts at the beginning of his sample period and
3In effect, I exclude all April 1999 transactions from the sample in order to get full calendar months of
data. However, I calculate the portfolios held at the end of April 1999, and thus any positions from this
period are included in the data.
4IincludestocksfromallofﬁciallistingsinSweden. ThepriceswerecollectedfromOMStockholmsb¨ orsen,
Nordic Growth Market, Aktietorget and Nya Marknaden.
5We do not wish to distinguish between an investor who begins her career by depositing stocks—and
therefore records a zero turnover—and an investor buying the same portfolio, who will record a turnover
of 50%.
6The stable attrition rate supports the hypothesis that most investors leave for exogenous reasons and
there are only 41 instances in which investors go bankrupt, i.e., record a return of -100%.
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Figure 2: Investors in the sample and the price level of stocks
The price path of the Swedish value-weighted index is plotted with a solid line (right scale) where the price is normalized to 100 on




























































Investors in the sample (Left scale)
Value weighted index (Right scale)
ﬁnd that 55% of the accounts fall out of the sample during the seven-year period in his
study, which suggests a mean attrition rate of around 0.65% per month. When investors
leave the sample, but are not replaced, there could potentially be a survivorship bias in
favor of more successful investors that continue trading. The sample under consideration
here contains all investors, and we could therefore measure the effect survivorship has
on performance. However, it is clear that the data set across investors, for the most part,
covers the bear market that followed the peak of the stock market boom in March 2000.
3.1 Sample summary
A description of the 324,736 transactions and 16,831 investors in the sample is presented
in Table 1. There are 287,723 buy and sell transactions and 37,013 deposits and redemp-
tions in all.
The average purchase is lower than the average sale, but as the number of purchases
exceeds sales, the total value purchased is larger than the value sold. It is likely that part
of this difference is attributable to new investors coming into the sample, thereby net
investing in the market.
There is a great deal of skewness in the transactions, as evidenced by the mean being
higher than the 75th percentile in all cases. This has implications for fees, as they are
ﬁxed within certain value brackets.7 Therefore, small trades will be costly if measured
7The standard fee charge in Swedish kronor, is SEK 89 (approx. USD 10) for each transaction. For each
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Table 1: Data Description: Transactions and Portfolios
Descriptive statistics of the transaction data are displayed in Panel A. The purchases and sales fees are averaged over the number of
trades. Portfolio size in Panel B is determined by the ﬁrst observation of total capital (as deﬁned in the main text) for each investor.
The mean turnover, number of observations, trades, stocks and technology weight are ﬁrst averaged for each investor over the months












Purchases, SEK 169,471 51,128 187,622 4,500 12,400 39,000 8,664.71
Purchases, fee in % 1.69 3.71 0.22 0.61 1.56 17.43
Sales, SEK 118,252 69,922 224,441 7,052 19,750 59,400 8,268.47
Sales, fee in % 1.94 12.48 0.16 0.48 1.12 13.34
Deposits 30,543 44,071 266,988 2,755 9,550 25,800 1,346.07












Portfolio obs. 265,342 15.77 8.44 8 18 23 n/a
Portfolio size 16,831 92,347 418,549 6,200 17,700 53,750 1,554.30
Turnover, SEK 16,831 74,392 846,646 616 2,532 11,281 16,963.95
Turnover, % 16,831 17.93 35.72 2.94 6,90 17.68 n/a
Number of trades 16,831 1.19 3.51 0.16 0.44 1.00 n/a
Number of stocks 16,831 3.30 2.95 1.38 2.36 4.00 n/a









Proportion,   
%
Age, All 16,831 38.95 12.35 29 37 48 100.00
Age, Men 13,768 38.43 12.20 29 36 47 81.80
Age, Women 3,063 41.24 12.74 31 39 51 18.20
         Panel C: Investor demographics
         Panel B: Monthly portfolios
         Panel A: Transactions
as an average per transaction as in Table 1. This is illustrated by the fact that the mean
purchase and sale fees are 1.69% and 1.94% measured on an average trade basis, whereas
the value-weighted fees, obtained by dividing total trade value by the sum of fees, are
as low as 0.20% and 0.16%, respectively. The median trade implies that a round-trip
transaction costs around 1%. The sharp differences in value and trade weighted fees
alone suggest that there may be considerable differences in performance depending on
the size of the trades, which ultimately is related to portfolio size.
There are 16,831 investors in the sample from which 265,342 portfolios are recon-
200,000 interval of trade value above 20,000, there is an additional charge of SEK 119. However, for the
most active investors, with more than 75 trades per quarter, the charge is only 5 basis points of the value of
the trade, or a minimum of SEK 79 per transaction.
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structed. To obtain a measure of portfolio size that is unrelated to investor returns, the
ﬁrst monthly observation of portfolio capital is used.8 Portfolio size varies substantially
between investors: the mean is SEK 92,347, and the median SEK 17,700.
The median for portfolio size in this sample is close to the ﬁgures from Statistics Swe-
den for the overall population. The median Swede owned Swedish stocks worth between
SEK20,000andSEK15,000attheendof1999and2001respectively, butthecorresponding
average is much higher at SEK 319,000 and SEK 183,000.9 The relative difference between
the means and medians between time periods indicates that new investors enter the mar-
ket. Between these dates, the share of the population that owned individual stocks rose
from 16% to almost 22%. This is an unobserved variable in the sample, but it does suggest
that a fair share of the investors studied here are new to the stock market.
The median investor in the sample holds an average of 2.33 stocks. The higher mean
suggests that there are a minority of investors with a much higher degree of diversiﬁ-
cation across holdings. That the mean and median investor holds few stocks may not
be so surprising given the relatively small value of the portfolio. In fact, roughly 18%, or
3,030 investors, hold only one stock. This feature of the data implies that the idiosyncratic
component of individual portfolio returns is high.
The sample consists of 82% men, making it similar to the sample of online traders in
Barber and Odean (2002). However, the median age is considerably lower. The median
age of all investors is 37, with no signiﬁcant difference in the age distribution between
men and women. Therefore, the composition of investors broadly supports the hypothe-
sis of Barber and Odean (2001a) that overconﬁdence is related to gender. If overconﬁdent
investors tend to self-select in becoming clients at online brokers, we may then expect to
ﬁnd them to be young and predominantly male.
Turnover is measured by dividing the total value of monthly trades by two times
the value of the portfolio holdings each month. The average monthly turnover for each
investor is almost 18%. The annualized turnover would therefore be 216%, implying that
these investors ﬂip their portfolios more than twice a year. By comparison, the Swedish
stock market average turnover between 1999 and 2002 is around 62%.10 This implies
that turnover among the investors considered here is more than four times as high as the
market in general. We also ﬁnd considerable cross-sectional variation in trading, as the
median investor only turns around 7.5% of the portfolio. Even if the median investor’s
turnover is much lower at an average yearly turnover rate of 90%, it is still well above the
8Portfolio capital includes the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the month as well as the value
of any net purchases during the month. Portfolio capital is formally deﬁned in Appendix A.
9The sharp difference between medians and means is even more extreme because the nationwide statis-
tics include entrepreneurs who own very large stakes in their companies.
10This measure is constructed by dividing the value of all trades at the Stockholm Stock Exchange by two
times the value of outstanding stock at year-end.
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Portfolio composition is analyzed with respect to industry classiﬁcation.11 The compa-
nies are categorized into nine industries: telecommunications, information technology, ﬁ-
nance, health care, industrials, consumer goods, media, raw materials and services. Port-
folio holdings are largely concentrated in two industry sectors: telecommunications and
information technology, combined and hereafter referred to as technology. The median
investor holds an average of 71% technology stocks, which represents a clear overweight
of the sector. The technology sector has a predominant role as it represented between 34%
and 48% of the value-weighted Swedish market index. On a relative basis, the mean in-
vestor in the sample allocates twice the weight to technology compared to the technology
index weight.12
The strong tilt towards these stocks among investors can have several explanations.
First, technology stocks are riskier, and investors may prefer to take higher risk. But ra-
tional investors diversify their portfolios to avoid idiosyncratic risk; they typically do not
choose only one stock. Second, it is reasonable to assume that companies in the technol-
ogy industry on average are smaller, and investors prefer small stocks. But the evidence
for this is not very clear. The median company for the consumer goods, media and ser-
vices industries are equally small or even smaller. Third, during this period, the technol-
ogy sector offered a wider set of companies that investors could choose from. There is
slightly more support for this, since only one other sector contains close to an equal num-
ber of stocks—industrials. This feature is relevant if investors follow the 1/n-heuristic
as suggested by Benartzi and Thaler (2001). Fourth, it is important to keep in mind that
during the Internet frenzy, new companies entered the stock market at an unprecedented
pace. It is possible, or even likely, that the news ﬂow was biased towards the technology
sector. Barber and Odean (2003) also propose that naive investors select stocks that have
experienced extreme price movements. This could also explain why risky technology
stocks are overrepresented in the sample.
Naive investors may therefore react to signals that are unrelated to information for
several reasons. But the rational principle of diversiﬁcation could be contrasted with
naive strategies. Sophisticated investors, who are less overconﬁdent and prone to react
to noise, are more likely to be better diversiﬁed than those following naive strategies. A
preliminary investigation of such systematic effects of investor behavior can be studied
in the correlations reported in Table 2.
Quite naturally, the number of stocks held and the value of the portfolio are highly
11The industry classiﬁcation is made by Aff¨ arsv¨ arlden, who also produce the value-weighted index used
here.
12This measure is obtained by dividing the investors weight by the overall technology sector index
weight, each month. It is not reported separately, because the results are similar to that of the absolute
weight, which in turn are easier to interpret.
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Table 2: Correlations: Individual characteristics
The table reports non-parametric Spearman correlations for 16,831 individual investor characteristics given in Table 1, excluding non-
entering observations. All values are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level, except the correlation between age and turnover















Turnover 0.09 1.00 ----
Number of 
trades 0.17 0.82 1.00 - - -
Number of 
stocks 0.24 0.10 0.31 1.00 - -
Technology 
weight -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.22 1.00 -
Age 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.15 -0.11 1.00
 
positively correlated, as are turnover and the number of trades. The fact that age and
portfolio value is positively related can be an indication that portfolio value in turn is
correlated with (unobservable) overall wealth. Age and technology weight are negatively
related, suggesting that stocks within this industry are more popular among younger
investors.
Two correlations are more interesting than others. The ﬁrst is portfolio value, which is
positivelycorrelatedwithboththenumberoftradesandturnover. Thisisincontradiction
to the common apprehension that trading is most frequent among small investors. The
second ﬁnding is a substantial negative correlation between the number of stocks in the
portfolio and the technology weight. There is, of course, a binary choice of industry
when few stocks are held, such that diversiﬁcation must by necessity be related to stock
holdings. What is not so obvious, as the negative correlation suggests, is that investors
on average choose a lower technology sector exposure when holding more stocks. This
indicates that investors pursue different strategies depending on portfolio composition.
The positive correlation between portfolio turnover and size, and the negative correla-
tionbetweentechnologyweightanddiversiﬁcation, suggestageneralpattern. Toanalyze
thesetwofeaturesofthedatainmoredepth, theinvestorsaresortedintoquintilesformed
on the basis of these variables.
3.2 Turnover and portfolio size
Given the major differences in median and mean fees, the performance of small investors
is likely to suffer due to their small-sized trades. Hence, it may be important to control
for portfolio size when looking at performance. I apply a two-pass sorting procedure. In
the ﬁrst pass, the investors are sorted by turnover into ﬁve groups that contain approx-
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Table 3: Quintiles sorted by turnover and portfolio size
Investors are ﬁrst sorted into quintiles based on their average turnover, excluding entering observations. A second sorting is con-
ducted on portfolio value, thereby partitioning each turnover quintile into ﬁve sub-quintiles based on portfolio size. Panel A and B
report the means of turnover in percent per month and portfolio size in SEK. USD 1 corresponds to about SEK 9 during the sample
period.
   
 
(Low)    
1234
(High)     
5 All
                Panel A: Mean turnover, monthly %  
Portfolio size 1 (Small) 0.00 1.24 4.27 10.26 41.56 11.47
Portfolio size 2 <0.01 1.37 4.12 10.43 48.05 12.79
Portfolio size 3 <0.01 1.36 4.18 10.37 53.22 13.83
Portfolio size 4 0.00 1.30 4.20 10.43 62.89 15.76
Portfolio size 5 (Large) <0.01 1.20 4.19 10.81 87.43 20.74
All <0.01 1.29 4.19 10.46 58.63 14.92
                Panel B: Mean portfolio size, SEK
Portfolio size 1 (Small) 2,882 3,592 3,444 3,555 4,223 3,539
Portfolio size 2 5,142 8,346 8,268 9,449 12,432 8,727
Portfolio size 3 9,801 18,304 18,284 20,799 30,341 19,506
Portfolio size 4 22,049 44,489 41,540 45,988 76,944 46,201
Portfolio size 5 (Large) 174,725 542,453 341,642 311,246 548,729 383,808
All 42,907 123,401 82,612 78,185 134,618 92,347
Turnover, quintiles
imately 3,366 investors each. In the second pass, each turnover quintile is sorted into
ﬁve equally sized sub-quintiles.13 There are then about 673 investors in 25 groups in the
turnover/ portfolio size dimension. Table 3 displays the means of turnover and size for
each group. The main difference in trading activity between investors is that those in
the lowest turnover quintile hardly ever trade, while those in the highest quintile trade
extensively. Those who trade the most have a turnover of almost 59% per month, which
on a yearly basis means that they buy and sell their portfolio almost seven times. In fact,
the investors in the top turnover quintile account for more than 60% of the trades.
Among the investors in turnover quintile 5, those with the largest sized portfolios
trade signiﬁcantly more than all other groups. Among these investors, turnover is almost
90% per month. This, in turn, drives the overall result that the quintile with the largest
portfolio size has the highest turnover rate. Comparing the overall means of turnover in
Table 1 and Table 3, it falls from 18% to 15% when only the non-entering observations are
included.
Portfolio size is also unevenly distributed across individuals. The mean size of the
smallest quintile is around 100 times smaller than the largest quintile. The investors with
13This sorting procedure is therefore similar to that used by, e.g., Fama and French (1992) when exploring
the book-to-market and size effect.
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Table 4: Quintiles sorted by technology weight and number of stocks
Investors are ﬁrst sorted into quintiles based on the average number of stocks in their portfolio. A second sorting is done on the
investors’ average technology weight, thereby partitioning each diversiﬁcation quintile into ﬁve sub-quintiles based on the average
technology weight. Panel A and B report the means of the number of stocks held and the technology weight in percent.
   
 
(Few)     
1234
(Many)   
5 All
                 Panel A: Mean number of stocks  
Technology weight 1 (Low) 1.00 1.65 2.43 3.71 8.65 3.49
Technology weight 2 1.02 1.72 2.48 3.71 8.35 3.45
Technology weight 3 1.00 1.54 2.48 3.70 7.78 3.30
Technology weight 4 1.00 1.74 2.50 3.71 7.43 3.28
Technology weight 5 (High) 1.00 1.60 2.19 3.49 6.65 2.99
All 1.01 1.65 2.42 3.66 7.77 3.30
            Panel B: Mean technology weight, %
Technology weight 1 (Low)    0.06   7.44  13.08  14.97 13.63  9.83
Technology weight 2  91.15  53.81  49.14  45.70 36.08 55.17
Technology weight 3 100.00  89.96  79.51  68.43 54.06 78.39
Technology weight 4 100.00 100.00  97.02  87.38 71.83 91.24
Technology weight 5 (High) 100.00 100.00 100.00  99.30 90.93 98.04
All  78.22  70.22  67.73  63.14 53.30 66.52
Diversification quintiles: Number of stocks held
the lowest trading activity clearly have smaller portfolios, around half the value of the
overall sample. The data also suggest that those who trade the most have larger portfolios
compared with the other size matched turnover quintiles.
3.3 Diversiﬁcation and technology weight
An identical approach is used to investigate how stock diversiﬁcation is related to in-
vestors technology weight. Investors are ﬁrst sorted by the number of stocks held and
then by the technology weight. Table 4 reveals that the mean number of stocks held
among the 20% of investors that are least diversiﬁed is close to one. In the top quin-
tile, they hold around eight stocks. Those who have a lower technology weight also
have slightly more stocks than those who have the highest weight—3.49% compared with
2.99%.
The most striking result is found in Panel B, where the mean technology weight de-
creases monotonically with the number of stocks held from 78% to 53%. This means that
four out of ﬁve investors who hold only one stock choose one in the technology sector.
Consequently, there is strong evidence of a systematic effect of diversiﬁcation that goes
beyond that of simply holding stocks of different companies. Investors with more stocks
in their portfolio choose to be less exposed to the technology sector. This suggests that
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investment strategies differ between groups of investors, and implies that there are un-
derlying differences in behavior that could be related to investment skill.
4 Results
The previous data analysis reveals considerable cross-sectional variation in trading and
diversiﬁcation that may be helpful in explaining performance. At the outset, we may
expect that excessive trading erodes performance, but the prior of how diversiﬁcation
should affect performance is not very clear. A random strategy—where investors hold
a few stocks selected at random—should be related to idiosyncratic risk only, and be
unrelated to mean returns. But this is true only if the strategy and associated expected re-
turns are independent. Overconﬁdent investors who follow naive investment strategies
will underestimate risk, and their forecasts for expected returns will be overly favorable.
Such investors are not only likely to take more systematic risk, but may also be less skilled
in choosing which stocks to select. In this case, performance may vary with diversiﬁca-
tion. Overconﬁdent investors who hold undiversiﬁed portfolios could be less skilled in
choosing which stocks to select.
To facilitate such comparisons, the results are presented in two parts. The ﬁrst part
begins by reviewing how portfolio returns are constructed from transaction data and pro-
poses a return decomposition. The market adjusted return can be split into components
that are designed to identify the returns that can be associated with investor turnover and
industry selection. The return differences are evaluated separately over the quintiles in
these dimensions, as in the previous section. The second part presents a panel regression
model. The individual characteristics are incorporated at the same time, such that we
obtain marginal effects of those found in the ﬁrst part.
4.1 Investor returns
The data are available in transaction form, from which portfolios are reconstructed. The
key issue, when deﬁning returns, is to identify the payoff and the corresponding cap-
ital that can be associated with it.14 Only a brief summary of the method is presented
here, without going into any details of the deﬁnitions. A more exhaustive explanation of
how portfolio excess returns are calculated from transaction data is given in Appendix A.
Three returns are used in the analysis: excess passive return, RP
i,t; total excess return, Ri,t;
and industry excess return, RInd
i,t . Each of them is explained below.
Passive excess return refers to the return of the portfolio held by investor i at date t − 1,
i.e., the beginning of the month. The payoff is calculated for each stock as the price change
14A related approach has been applied by Linnainmaa (2003), who investigates daytrades. However, the
method considered here deﬁnes payoffs and required capital quite differently.
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over all stocks in the portfolio, and normalized into a return by the value of the total
position. This value, which is the required capital to ﬁnance the portfolio, is referred to as
position capital. We denote the passive excess return adjusted with the 30-day T-bill rate
RP
i,t.
When investors trade, the payoff is calculated as follows for each stock. Suppose a
transaction in a certain stock for an individual takes place at date d, which is at some point
during month t. If the trade is a purchase and the stock is held throughout month t, the
net proceeds are calculated from date d to t, and conversely, if it is a sale of a stock owned
at date t − 1, from t − 1 to d. As is shown in Appendix A, intra-month transactions for
each stock can be aggregated and averaged, so the net effect applies to what has already
been stated. The sum of the payoffs over each stock in the portfolio is the value change of
the portfolio during month t.
The key now is to identify the capital components associated with trading. The mini-
mum capital requirement for each investor is assumed to be the position capital measured
at date t − 1. If purchases exceed sales, in cases requiring additional funds, these funds
are added to the capital base and labelled trading capital.15 Total capital is thus the sum of
position capital and trading capital.
The portfolio return is in excess of the interest rate, which is adjusted for in the fol-
lowing way. Reducing the total payoff with the cost of position capital is straightforward,
because this is the minimum cost for ﬁnancing this portfolio. However, when there is
trading, investors can be net sellers or net buyers. Interest is added to the payoff if they
are net sellers, and deducted if they are net buyers. The interest associated with trading
involves calculating the cash balance for each investor at each point in time during the
month. This “ﬁctitious cash account” therefore assures that net buyers or net sellers are
charged or compensated for cash-ﬂows at the going 30-day interest rate.16 The resulting
total excess return is denoted Ri,t, and includes all trades between t−1 and t. Therefore—if
there is no trading—RP
i,t coincides with Ri,t.
The return measure does not include dividends. This exclusion will bias the returns
measured here downwards. However, this bias is expected to be small. The overall mar-
ket paid little in dividends during the period, and especially the growth ﬁrms held by the
investors in the sample. For this reason, the market return used as benchmark does not
include dividends.
The third and last return needed for the analysis is the industry excess return, RInd
i,t ,
15Note that the timing of sales and purchases matters for the deﬁnition of the capital base. Consider a
sale and a purchase of the same value. If the purchase precede the sale, capital is required whereas there is
no effect if it were the other way around.











constructed as follows. The industry weights for the portfolio the investor holds at date
t − 1 are calculated. The industry return is the weighted average of the excess returns on
the nine industry indexes, and therefore tracks the index composition of each investor’s
portfolio.
4.1.1 A simple return decomposition
The decomposition aims to clarify the return difference between a passive strategy (ex-
cluding trading) and an active strategy (including trading) as well as how a passive strat-
egy relates to various benchmarks. By using the three returns, we can offer the following
deﬁnitions. Market-adjusted return is deﬁned as
∆IMi,t ≡ Ri,t − RM,t,
where RM,t is the excess return of the value-weighted market benchmark. Trade-adjusted
return is deﬁned as
∆IPi,t ≡ Ri,t − R
P
i,t,
and serves as an approximation of the contribution of active trading. Passive return can
be thought of in this setting as an own-benchmark return in the same spirit as proposed
by Grinblatt and Titman (1993), who investigate the performance of mutual funds. They
argue that any asset pricing model is sensitive to its particular assumptions, but the own-
benchmark can serve as an intuitive and appealing means of comparison. Grinblatt and
Titman use yearly and quarterly ﬁxed portfolios when deﬁning the benchmark portfolio.
Here, passive return is deﬁned on a monthly basis. Investors in this sample have a much
higher turnover than mutual fund managers, and there is enough variation in a month
to enable interesting comparisons. Passive return serves as a natural benchmark when
investigating if rebalancing is proﬁtable for investors. It should be noted that when there
is no portfolio observation at the beginning of the month, we cannot observe a passive
return. To make investor returns comparable with or without trading, only non-entering
observations will be considered. More importantly, measured trading costs can be dif-
ﬁcult to interpret if the ﬁrst purchased portfolio is included. A buy-and-hold investor
needs to buy the portfolio at some stage, but transaction costs are averaged over a very
long time.




which is a measure of the return contribution stemming from the choice of industry com-
pared to the market benchmark. It follows by construction that if an investor holds the
market value weights, the difference is zero.
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and measures the difference between the actual portfolio held at the beginning of the
month and a portfolio that tracks the return of the chosen industries. This can be inter-
preted as a measure of how well investors can select stocks within industries. Consider
an investor who owns two stocks, but in different industries. Even if the industries un-
derperform the market, the selected stocks might still outperform the chosen industries.
This is exactly what is captured by the industry-adjusted passive return.
By using the deﬁnitions above, we can express the market-adjusted return as the sum
of three components: the trade-adjusted return, the market-adjusted industry return, and
the industry-adjusted passive return
∆IMi,t = ∆IPi,t + ∆INDMi,t + ∆PINDi,t.
Furthermore, it follows that we are also able to deﬁne the market-adjusted passive return
as
∆PMi,t ≡ ∆IMi,t − ∆IPi,t = ∆INDMi,t + ∆PINDi,t = R
P
i,t − RM,t,
which then completes the link between the ﬁve deﬁnitions and three returns. Table 5
displays the results of this decomposition in four ways: returns with or without fees, and
by weighing returns equally or with total capital.
The average investor in the sample had a monthly return of -3.38%, which implies an
annualized excess return of a substantial -34%. The strong negative return indicates that
investors, on average, have experienced very high losses. This can partly be explained by
the fact that investors enter the market sequentially, as illustrated by Figure 2. The large
number of investors who entered the sample late inevitably faced a weaker stock market.
The market-adjusted return makes a crude adjustment for such effects. Still, investors
losebetween1.8%to2.1%permonthcomparedtothemarket, includingfees. Theequally-
weighted means of the trade-adjusted return reveal that 32 basis points can be explained
by fees alone. In annualized terms, 32 basis points per month means that the average in-
vestor paid around 3.8% per year of her portfolio value in fees. This is more than twice the
annualfeechargedbymostmutualfunds. Further, theeffectofvalue-weightinginvestors
on fees is clear, implying that large investors pay less in fees expressed as a percentage of
the portfolio return.
There is a small but still negative difference in the trade-adjusted return even when
fees are excluded. This is evidence that investors on average do not beat their own-
benchmark deﬁned by the portfolio held at the beginning of the month. The trade-
adjusted mean when investors are value-weighted actually implies that large-sized in-
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Table 5: Investor mean returns: A simple decomposition
The market-adjusted return is decomposed into three parts. The trade-adjusted return measures the effect of rebalancing. The dif-
ference between the market-adjusted return and the trade-adjusted return is labelled the market-adjusted passive return, which in
turn has two components: The market-adjusted industry return measures the contribution stemming from industry selection with
respect to the market, and the industry-adjusted passive return measures stock-picking ability within industries. There are 251,879
non-entering observations in the sample from which averages of 16,831 investor mean returns are constructed. The means for investor











None Portfolio excess return, R i,t Investor total excess return.
-3.05     
(0.05)
-3.38     
(0.05)
-2.97     
(0.05)
-3.07     
(0.05)
None
Market-adjusted return,                   
∆IM = R i,t - R M,t
Total return including monthly 
rebalancing in excess of market.
-1.78     
(0.05)
-2.08     
(0.05)
-1.70     
(0.05)
-1.76     
(0.05)
-
Trade-adjusted return,                  
∆IP = R i,t - R
P
i,t
Trading contribution from 
rebalancing.
-0.21     
(0.02)
-0.37     
(0.02)
-0.13     
(0.02)
-0.05     
(0.02)
=
Market-adjusted passive return,        
∆PM = R
P
i,t - R M,t
Buy-and-hold return in excess of 
market.
-1.57     
(0.05)
-1.71     
(0.05)
-
Market-adjusted industry return,      
∆INDM = R
Ind
i,t - R M,t
Industry contribution to buy-and-
hold return.
-1.20     
(0.02)
-1.28     
(0.02)
=






Stock selection contribution to 
buy-and-hold return.
-0.37     
(0.04)
-0.43     
(0.04)
is significant at the 5% level.
Mean standard errors in parentheses. All variables are significantly different from zero at the 1% level or lower, except equally-weighted ∆IP without fees, which  
Without fees With fees Returns, monthly %
vestors lose more than median investors when fees are excluded. The fee itself only ex-
plains some 8 basis points of the total 21 points.
The difference between the market-adjusted return and the trade-adjusted return can
be further analyzed and decomposed into two parts. Both of these are deﬁned for passive
portfolios, such that they are free from trading. Hence there is no need for a separate
analysis with respect to fees.
The market-adjusted industry return shows the difference between the market return
and the particular choice of industries. Most of what can explain the deviations from
the market return is embedded here. Investors have chosen to invest in industries that
have underperformed relative to the market, which is most likely a direct consequence of
the strong tilt towards technology stocks. As this simple decomposition does not include
any risk-adjustment, this effect might very well be a result of investors choosing higher
systematic risk.
Risk is likely to be less problematic when evaluating the industry-adjusted passive
return, as there is considerably less variation in risk within industries than between. The
industry-adjusted passive return reveals that the investors on average lose around 43 ba-
sis points from choosing stocks that underperform any chosen industry. This is interest-
ing, as it suggests that individuals may systematically choose stocks that underperform.
Furthermore, the somewhat higher value-weighted return indicates that this pattern is
19i
i







more predominant among investors with small portfolios.
If we assume that all systematic risk is captured by industries, the decomposition
suggests that investors underperform the market by around 80 basis points. In this case,
trading and stock selection are roughly equally important. To examine these two features
of the data in more depth, the following sections report the returns associated with the
corresponding quintiles of Table 3 and Table 4.
4.1.2 Returns: Trading and portfolio size
We will now look more closely at how the trade-adjusted return is related across investor
groups. The mean return is calculated for each of the 25 groups of investors deﬁned in
Section 3.2. This is also done for all investors in each quintile in the two dimensions,
and ﬁnally for the whole sample. Table 6 reports the mean returns corresponding to the
sample partition in Table 3. Associated standard errors are given in parentheses.
As there is virtually no trading in the lowest turnover quintile, there can be no devi-
ation from the own-benchmark, and so the passive return equals the total return. This
means that the difference in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 is zero. It is clear that when trad-
ing activity increases, performance declines. The most active traders underperform their
benchmark portfolio by 95 basis points compared with only 52 for traders in the fourth
quintile. This general effect seems to be valid for all portfolio sizes, but the smallest in-
vestors contribute most to this general pattern.
Therefore, we ﬁnd a size effect as well as a trading effect: the mean underperfor-
mance for the investors with the smallest portfolio size is 79 basis points, but only 15
for the largest. When fees are excluded from the analysis, there is still a weak size and
turnover effect, but only 5 basis points are lost on average when fees are excluded. One
reasonforthisisthatinvestors, onaverage, pursuestrategiesthatareunproﬁtable. Barber
and Odean (2000) attribute a similar, but daily, effect to costs associated with the bid-ask
spread.
It is somewhat puzzling that the largest investors who trade the most lose up to 42
basispoints, excludingfees. WhencomparingPanelAandB,weseethatfeesonlyexplain
17 basis points of the total trade-adjusted return. On the other hand, this group was also
found to be trading more than twice as much as the smallest investors in Table 3. A
net cost of 42 basis points may not be so conspicuous considering that almost 90% of
the portfolio is traded in one month. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, the investors with the
smallest portfolios that trade the most gain 31 basis points by trading, excluding fees.
However, the performance in this group is so dispersed that it is insigniﬁcant.
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Table 6: Mean trade-adjusted returns
The trade-adjusted return measures the difference between the total portfolio return and the passive return, which is the portfolio
held at the beginning of the month. The return is reported with fees in Panel A, and without fees in Panel B. There are approximately
673 investors in each sub-quintile corresponding to the partition in the turnover and portfolio size dimensions in Table 3.
   
 
(Low)       
1234
(High)      
5 All
Panel A: ∆IP, Trade-adjusted returns including fees, monthly %
Size 1 (Small) 0.00        
(0.00)
 -0.20
***       
(0.02)
 -0.53
***       
(0.02)
 -1.22
***       
(0.13)
 -2.01
***       
(0.35)
 -0.79
***       
(0.08)
Size 2 <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.13
***       
(0.03)
 -0.37
***       
(0.03)
 -0.59
***       
(0.07)
 -0.87
***       
(0.26)
 -0.39
***       
(0.06)
Size 3 <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.09
***       
(0.02)
 -0.20
***       
(0.03)
 -0.40
***       
(0.09)
 -0.78
***       
(0.28)
 -0.29
***       
(0.06)
Size 4 0.00        
(0.00)
 -0.06
***       
(0.01)
 -0.15
***       
(0.03)
 -0.28
***       
(0.06)
 -0.51
***       
(0.17)
 -0.20
***       
(0.04)
Size 5 (Large) <0.01       
(<0.01)
-0.01       
(0.01)
 -0.06
***       
(0.03)
 -0.11
***       
(0.05)
 -0.59
***       
(0.12)
 -0.15
***       
(0.03)
All <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.10
***       
(<0.01)
 -0.26
***       
(0.01)
 -0.52
***       
(0.04)
 -0.95
***     
(0.11)
 -0.37
***       
(0.02)
Panel B: ∆IP, Trade-adjusted returns excluding fees, monthly %
Size 1 (Small) 0.00        
(0.00)
 -0.05
**        
(0.02)
 -0.07
*         
(0.04)
 -0.21
*         
(0.12)
 0.31        
(0.33)
-0.01       
(0.07)
Size 2 <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.04       
(0.03)
 -0.13
***       
(0.03)
 -0.12
*         
(0.07)
 0.11        
(0.26)
-0.04       
(0.05)
Size 3 <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.03       
(0.02)
 -0.06
**        
(0.03)
 -0.08       
(0.09)
 -0.17       
(0.28)
-0.07       
(0.06)
Size 4 0.00        
(0.00)
 -0.02
*         
(0.01)
 -0.06
**        
(0.03)
 -0.11
*         
(0.06)
 -0.17     
(0.17)
 -0.07
*         
(0.04)
Size 5 (Large) <0.01       
(<0.01)
0.01        
(0.01)
-0.01       
(0.02)
 -0.01       
(0.05)
 -0.42
***    
(0.12)
 -0.09
***       
(0.03)
All <0.01       
(<0.01)
 -0.02
**        
(<0.01)
 -0.06
***       
(0.01)
 -0.10
***       
(0.04)
 -0.07       
(0.11)
 -0.05
**        
(0.02)
Mean standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for a t-test of the mean to be different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and











4.1.3 Returns: Diversiﬁcation and technology weights
The natural candidates to analyze the effect of diversiﬁcation across stock holdings are
the market-adjusted industry return and the industry-adjusted passive return. As an ex-
tension to Table 4, these returns are investigated across diversiﬁcation and the technology
weight, which here serves as a crude measure of risk.
The market-adjustedindustry returnmeasures howthe choice ofindustry hasaffected
investors portfolio return relative to the market. The column on the far right of Panel A
in Table 7 reveals that the group of investors who underweighted the technology sector
outperformed the value-weighted index. But since over 75% of the investors in this sam-
ple did the opposite, the means become negative moving down the column. There is
a similar effect across the quintiles sorted by the degree of diversiﬁcation. The market-
adjusted industry return is more negative for investors with few stocks, which is most
likely due to the technology weight that was found to be higher among these investors.
Therefore, these results simply conﬁrm that investors chose to carry a lot of risk, but faced
unfavorable market conditions.
Panel B provides more interesting results in this respect. The industry-adjusted pas-
sive return controls for the industry choice for each investor at each point in time. Any
relative deviation from this benchmark stems from the investor’s choice of individual
stocks within each industry. The risk among ﬁrms within industries is likely to be more
similar. The overall result, which shows that 43 basis points are lost due to stock selection
within the industries, is substantial.
Thereislittlesystematicvariationacrosstechnologyquintiles(movingverticallydown
the rightmost column of Panel B in Table 7). If any, those with lower technology weights
appear to underperform their industry benchmark more than those with higher weights.
Therefore, there is no evidence that the overall negative return stemming from which
stocks to buy in a given industry is related to a preference for technology stocks.
There is a much clearer pattern found horizontally in Panel B of Table 7. Investors
with few stocks underperform more relative to those with many stocks in their portfolios.
One must bear in mind that the industry-adjusted passive return measures the relative
performance of individual stocks and any mix of industries. A random strategy will
“average out” investor returns over diversiﬁcation quintiles if choices were independent.
Choosing several stocks within a given industry should reduce the variance of such a
portfolio, but not change the mean. Here, we ﬁnd that virtually all investor groups with
few stocks have inferior mean returns than those who have many. The ability to target
individual stocks that perform better increases with the number of stocks held.
The diversiﬁcation measure could be sensitive to investors going bankrupt. It is more
likely that those investors who left the sample due to bankruptcy are to be found in the
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Table 7: Mean industry-adjusted returns
The market-adjusted industry return in Panel A measures the return difference between the market and the chosen industry portfolio
for each investor. The industry-adjusted passive return in Panel B measures the difference between the chosen industry portfolio and
the actual chosen stocks of the portfolio held at the beginning of the month. There are approximately 673 investors in each sub-quintile
corresponding to the partition in the technology weight and diversiﬁcation dimensions in Table 4.
   
 
(Few)       
1234
(Many)      
5 All




***         
(0.11)
1.65
***         
(0.08)
 1.33
***        
(0.07)
 1.11
***        
(0.07)
0.93
***         
(0.06)
1.41





***       
(0.10)
 -0.60
***       
(0.08)
 -0.49
***       
(0.06)
 -0.27
***       
(0.05)
 0.01        
(0.04)
 -0.75





***       
(0.12)
 -2.43
***       
(0.06)
 -1.94
***       
(0.07)
 -1.48
***       
(0.07)
 -0.80
***       
(0.05)
 -1.91





***       
(0.10)
 -2.56
***       
(0.12)
 -2.81
***       
(0.07)
 -2.41
***       
(0.05)
 -1.60
***      
(0.05)
 -2.45





***       
(0.10)
 -2.97
***       
(0.09)
 -2.72
***       
(0.10)
 -2.77
***       
(0.10)
 -2.13
***       
(0.10)
 -2.68
***       
(0.04)
All  -1.78
***       
(0.06)
 -1.38
***       
(0.05)
 -1.32
***       
(0.04)
 -1.17
***       
(0.04)
 -0.72
***       
(0.03)
 -1.28
***       
(0.02)




***       
(0.41)
 -0.16       
(0.28)
 -0.62
***       
(0.17)
 -0.45
***       
(0.14)
 -0.17
**        
(0.09)
 -0.53




 -0.40       
(0.27)
 -0.49
**        
(0.24)
 -0.89
***       
(0.20)
 -0.29
*         
(0.15)
 -0.33
***       
(0.08)
 -0.48





***       
(0.31)
 -0.11       
(0.18)
 -0.40
***       
(0.15)
 -0.27
*         
(0.15)
 -0.36
***       
(0.12)
 -0.41




 -0.22       
(0.35)
 -0.60
***       
(0.21)
 -0.23
*         
(0.14)
 -0.11       
(0.11)
 -0.38
***      
(0.10)
 -0.31





**        
(0.29)
 -0.03       
(0.24)
 -0.61
***       
(0.23)
 -0.57
***       
(0.20)
 -0.26
*         
(0.16)
 -0.42
***       
(0.10)
All  -0.68
***       
(0.15)
 -0.28
***       
(0.10)
 -0.55
***       
(0.08)
 -0.34
***       
(0.07)
 -0.30
***       
(0.05)
 -0.43
***       
(0.04)
All, excl. bankrupt 
investors
 -0.55
***       
(0.14)
 -0.22
***       
(0.10)
 -0.54
***       
(0.08)
 -0.34
***       
(0.07)
 -0.30
***       
(0.05)
 -0.43
***       
(0.04)
Mean standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for a t-test of the mean to be different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level are marked (*), (**), and (***).
Diversification quintiles: Number of stocks held
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group holding only one stock. The bottom row in Panel B of Table 7 reports the means
when these investors are excluded from the sample. Even if the performance rise for one-
stock investors, they still underperform by almost twice the amount compared to those
best diversiﬁed.
The systematic effect of diversiﬁcation on performance suggests that this variable
could be related to experience or skill, but the relatively high average underperformance
could also be an indication that investors choose stocks that are riskier than their respec-
tive industry benchmarks. If this is the case, such risks should also be correlated across
investors in the diversiﬁcation dimension.
4.1.4 Summary of results from the return decomposition
In all, three results are obtained from the return decomposition. First, investors that trade
more, lose more. This is found to be almost entirely related to fees, which in turn are
related to the size of the portfolio. Large portfolios are less affected by fees due to the
fee structure that involves minimum costs. Second, the high gear towards technology
stocks in combination with bad market timing means that most of what is lost above the
market-adjusted return is related to industry choice. Third and last, the number of stocks
held is found to be related to how investors perform when adjusting for industry choice.
These preliminary ﬁndings are interesting from a descriptive viewpoint and to un-
derstand the data. On the other hand, to be able to make any ﬁrm statements about
performance, there is a need to make riskadjustments and to control for interdependence
among the measured effects.
4.2 Panel estimation
The natural starting point when building a model for portfolio evaluation is the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). When using the market return as a benchmark to assess
the risk of a portfolio, it ignores common variation caused by time-varying expectations.
Traditional, unconditional models can ascribe abnormal performance to an investment
strategy that only relies on public information as shown, for instance, by Breen, Glosten,
and Jagannathan (1989).
Further, given the size of this sample, modelling a separate beta for each investor
is not a realistic option. On the other hand, it would be desirable to allow for hetero-
geneous preferences and investment strategies. The goal, therefore, is to allow beta to
vary between investors in some predetermined and structured manner, while allowing
for time-variation.
The asset pricing model suggested here is an extension of the conditional CAPM pro-
posed by Ferson and Schadt (1996). Let us assume that investor returns can be described
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There are i investors grouped into K investor risk characteristics. The investor char-
acteristics are speciﬁc to each individual and hence ﬁxed over time. In addition, there are
L information or state variables zl,t−1 which describe the investors’ opportunity set and is
thesameforallindividuals. Thestatevariablesrepresentinformationthatiscommonand
knowntotheinvestorsint. Lowercaselettersforthecharacteristicsandinformationvari-
ables are deviations from unconditional means, yk,i = Yk,i − Y k,. and zl,t−1 = Zl,t−1 − Zl,..
The excess return of the market benchmark is denoted by RM,t and εi,t is an investor and
time-speciﬁc disturbance term. The coefﬁcient B0 can be thought of as the average beta
with B1,...,BK+J as linear response coefﬁcients to investor characteristics and state vari-
ables.17
In this way, we obtain rich variation in the cross-section, but the individual character-
istics are kept ﬁxed over time as to keep the interpretation of the results clear. Similarly,
the proxy for the information set across investors is kept constant, but varies over time.
A typical implementation of the model speciﬁed by equation (1) is to add intercept
terms for each investor and then test the null hypothesis that they are jointly or individ-
ually zero. However, the interest here is to relate performance to investor characteristics.
We already have reasons to believe that the strong prediction of market efﬁciency may
not be applicable to online investors. Online investors are not well diversiﬁed. In addi-
tion, they face higher transaction and search costs than, for instance, mutual funds. They
are also more likely to be subject to behavioral biases such as overconﬁdence, and follow
naive strategies that may affect their performance.
In essence, it is of interest to model the intercept by controlling for the investor char-
acteristics in various ways. Therefore, the regressions performed is of the form
Ri,t = A0 +
J X
j=1











17The average beta is the unconditional mean of the conditional beta with respect to the instruments.
The linear response coefﬁcients can be thought of as an approximation of a Taylor expansion around their
means, ignoring the higher order terms if the responses are in fact non-linear.
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where there are J controls for investor types cj,i, which then vary between individuals.
The controls are also demeaned to preserve the interpretation of A0 as the measured av-
erage abnormal return.
We can identify the parameters in (2) with the following moment conditions
E (εi,t) = 0, ∀i,
E (εi,tcj,i) = 0, ∀i,j,
E (εi,tRM,t) = 0, ∀i,
E(εi,tRM,tyk,i) = 0, ∀i,k,
E(εi,tRM,tzl,t−1) = 0, ∀i,l, (3)
such that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The moment
conditions in (3) are estimated with GMM, but the point estimates coincide with those
obtained by OLS.18 The main difference is that the variance-covariance matrix allows for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This is a desirable feature, because standard
methods run a clear risk of overstating the precision of the estimates.19
The sample moment conditions corresponding to (3) are explicitly considered in Ap-
pendix B along with other details regarding the estimation procedure.
4.2.1 Selection of variables
The performance analysis is conducted directly in the panel. The previous preliminary
analysis found that portfolio size, turnover, and the number of stocks in the portfolio can
be important determinants of cross-sectional abnormal performance. These variables are
therefore chosen to parameterize the intercept. The same variables are used to control
for beta risk across investors. In addition, age and gender are included as controls for
heterogeneous risk between investors. The paragraphs below explain these choices.
One of the reasons for the difference in average performance between equally and
value-weighted performance may be that risk is related to portfolio size. This can be
linked to a relative risk aversion argument: an individual could be prepared to gamble
small amounts compared to the level of wealth. Such an investor is likely to take high
risk compared to the investor who has more at stake. If this is an important feature of the
data, it will be controlled for. Since portfolio size is extremely skewed, the logarithm of
the individual size measure is used.
Turnover can be important in two ways. Technically, high turnover could mean that
18This follows directly from the OLS assumption E(uX) = 0, by substituting for u and solving for the
parameters of the model.
19The standard OLS assumption referred to here is that errors are independently distributed. This is
clearly too strict an assumption for the data set under consideration.
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cash is held in the portfolio. This may affect the return measure, since trading capital in-
creases, and ultimately lower our beta estimates.20 Alternatively, high turnover investors
might in fact choose less risky investment strategies. Further, as turnover is included
among the intercept terms, it is also a desirable control variable for risk. This is also the
case for diversiﬁcation, deﬁned by the number of stocks. In addition, the degree of diver-
siﬁcation could also be correlated with risk, since the allocation to the technology sector
varies with the number of stocks held.
Age will matter when old investors have less human capital as a resource for future
income; they may prefer to take lower stock market risk. The reason, as shown by Bodie,
Merton, and Samuelson (1991), is that such investors have less ﬂexibility than younger
investors to adjust their labor supply and consumption if savings were to deteriorate. In
this sample, older people may simply ﬁnd high beta technology stocks less attractive than
young people do.
Barber and Odean (2001a) argue that men are more overconﬁdent than women; their
study conﬁrms that men trade more, and therefore do not perform as well as women. If
men are more overconﬁdent, they may also load up on more systematic risk. Also, Levin,
Snyder, and Chapman (1997) ﬁnd, in an experimental setting involving gambles, that
women tend to be more risk-averse than men. A gender dummy for women investors is
therefore included in the riskadjustment.
When specifying the information or state variables, it is difﬁcult to know what infor-
mation is relevant. The work of Keim and Stambaugh (1986), and Campbell (1987) shows
that lagged stock and money market variables can have signiﬁcant predictive power for
the market risk premium. With the obvious risk of data snooping, the stock index return,
the level of the 30-day Treasury bill and the yield spread between a 10-year and 1-year
government bond are included in the regressions.
4.2.2 Regression results
The ﬁrst column of Table 8 marked Model I shows that investor monthly performance
is around -1.29% in an unconditional single-index speciﬁcation. The beta is around 1.4,
reﬂecting that investors in this sample take on considerable market risk.
The second and third regression condition the beta on time variation and heterogene-
ity in the cross-section. The average performance increases to -0.74%, the average beta
increases and its standard deviation falls. This shows that the conditional model indeed
controls for important variation in the betas and that the unconditional speciﬁcation is
misleading. In fact, the average underperformance is no longer signiﬁcant, even though
it is still highly negative.
20This is only true for investors who liquidate or acquire a total net position. Rebalancing a portfolio does
not imply a change in trading capital itself.
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The objective of the panel model is more about seeing how performance varies with
investor characteristics than making inferences about risk. The results for the conditional
betas are therefore only discussed brieﬂy. The betas vary signiﬁcantly with the charac-
teristics in the cross-section, but the effect is generally small. For instance, a positive,
one-standard deviation change in age above the mean produces about the same effect
as when the investor is female: a decrease in beta of around 0.03. The negative effects
of turnover and diversiﬁcation are larger but still small: about two or three times larger
than for age. The beta coefﬁcient for portfolio size was never signiﬁcant, so it is excluded
from all regressions. The relatively low variability in the betas raises some concern as to
whether some cross-sectional variation in risk is not controlled for. However, a robust-
ness check at the end of this section conﬁrms all of the main results that follow from the
inferences made in Table 8.
The adjusted R2 is reported in Table 8, even though it is difﬁcult to interpret when
we have observations in two dimensions. Nevertheless it gives an indication of how
substantial the idiosyncratic component of the returns is for the overall sample. About 30
percent of the total variation is explained by the models under consideration.
The key results regarding investor performance and characteristics are reiterated by
the panel regressions. Model IV reports the results of including turnover and portfolio
size alone, and Model V when the diversiﬁcation variable is also included.
The separate effect of turnover is a loss in performance of 1.8 basis points for each
percent increase in turnover. This relation is found to be somewhat convex; that is, the
marginal effect of turnover diminishes for the majority of investors.21 These results are
quite devastating for most investors. The coefﬁcient estimates imply that around 85 basis
points are lost in monthly performance when controlling for portfolio size for the group
of most active traders. One should keep in mind that the median portfolio in the sample
is small, which is an important explanation for the turnover effect. The results of Model
IV imply that investors whose portfolio is twice the size of the mean investor, or around
SEK 35,000, gain almost 15 basis points compared to the sample average.
In the ﬁnal model considered in Table 8—labelled Model V—the diversiﬁcation vari-
able is included in the regression. The coefﬁcients for turnover are slightly reduced, but
the marginal effect of portfolio size is much smaller. This is because the effect of port-
folio size is somewhat crowded out by diversiﬁcation, as the number of stocks and size
are positively correlated variables. Performance is unlikely to be a linear function of the
number of stocks held over a wider range of stock holdings, but tests for non-linearities
did not produce any signiﬁcant results. Investors who hold one more stock than the av-
21The break-point where the effect of turnover increases marginally is around 250%, and is overall pos-
itive at 500% per month. There are 16 investors that trade more than 500%. Their average monthly total
excess return is -0.13% which is clearly above the overall sample average. Such “extreme traders” could be
therefore be outperforming in the sample.
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Table 8: Panel regression estimates: Main results
There are ﬁve regressions measuring performance in the panel. Model I is a simple unconditional, single-index model, and Model II
conditions beta risk on the state variables as described in the text. Model III adjusts for risk in the cross-section as well, whereas IV
and V characterize the intercept on trading, portfolio size, and the degree of diversiﬁcation, measured as the number of stocks in the
portfolio. The dependent variable is the investors’ total excess return, and there are 251,879 observations and 16,831 investors in all
cases.
Model name
I   
Unconditional
II         
Conditional
III         
Conditional
IV        
Conditional


















*            
(0.679)
-0.747       
(0.614)
-0.740       
(0.607)
-0.740       
(0.612)
-0.741       
(0.613)
Turnoveri --- -1.771
***        
(0.642)
-1.731





**        
(0.162)
0.352





**        
(0.105)
0.157





*      
(0.041)
B 0
Average     
Beta
1.415
***           
(0.105)
1.436
***           
(0.062)
1.444
***           
(0.061)
1.444
***           
(0.062)
1.443




***        
(0.032)
-0.101
***        
(0.031)
-0.101




*        
(0.015)
-0.028
*        
(0.015)
-0.028




***        
(0.040)
-0.182
***        
(0.037)
-0.185





***        
(0.006)
-0.035
***        
(0.006)
-0.033





***         
(0.690)
2.203
***        
(0.680)
2.206
***          
(0.678)
2.201
***       
(0.677)
Long m.    
short bondt-1
- 0.247
**        
(0.110)
0.248
**       
(0.111)
0.248
**          
(0.112)
0.248
**        
(0.112)
Short               
ratet-1
- 5.377
***   
(1.870)
5.117
***   
(1.904)
5.118
***        
(1.907)
5.132
***       
(1.902)
Adjusted         
R
2 0.296 0.307 0.309 0.310 0.310
for the average beta is B 0=1.
theses. Significant parameter estimates at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are marked (*), (**), and (***). The null hypothesis
Group   
of       

















erage investor gain an additional 7 basis points in performance. This means that those in
the top quintile of diversiﬁed holdings gain some 30 basis points over the average.
The negative intercept of 74 basis points implies an annualized underperformance of
about 8.5%. Barber and Odean (2000) ﬁnd that a portfolio consisting of the top quintile of
the most active investors loses around 7% annually compared to those who do not trade.
The two results are related in that Barber and Odean’s most active investors trade about
as much as the average investor considered here.
To put the model to additional tests, the regressions of Table 9 use the speciﬁed ﬁ-
nal model with alternative assumptions. Model VI and VII substitute for the dependent
variable, and instead use the investor return excluding fees and the passive return. The
ﬁrst return includes trading, but at zero cost; the second measures the return on the ﬁxed
portfolio held at the beginning of the month. When fees are excluded, the mean perfor-
mance increases by roughly 21 basis points. When trading is disregarded altogether, it
improves by 26 basis points. None of the intercepts is signiﬁcant, but the means reiterate
the evidence reported earlier that investors would have been better off not trading even
if it was costless. The coefﬁcients for turnover and portfolio size diminish, and are now
insigniﬁcant. However, the coefﬁcient for diversiﬁcation is virtually unchanged. This is
the case for both Model VI and VII, which consolidates the evidence that the parameter
for diversiﬁcation picks up performance that is unrelated to trading and portfolio size.
There is no support for a more general negative effect of portfolio size that was found in
Panel B of Table 3 when fees are excluded. The size-coefﬁcient is positive but insigniﬁcant
in both speciﬁcations that exclude fees.
As discussed previously, investors who on average trade more may hold a larger pro-
portion of cash in their portfolio, which in turn may affect the measured risk. The co-
efﬁcient for turnover in Model VII does not support this hypothesis. It is smaller, but
still signiﬁcantly negative, which indicates that high turnover investors also hold passive
portfolios that are less risky on average.
The survivorship bias in the sample is likely to be large due to the high attrition rate.
Only investors active at sample-end are included in Model VIII reported in Table 9, and
theinterceptshowsthattheaverageperformanceincreasesby11basispoints. Onayearly
basis, this means that the survivorship bias in the sample is in the vicinity of 1.3%, which
is about double the size usually found for mutual funds. Further, the effect of diversiﬁca-
tion is virtually unchanged, indicating that this effect is not driven by investors leaving
the sample.
The sample does not enable us to distinguish between individuals who are new to the
stock market and those who have owned stocks before. A very crude way of deﬁning
new or inexperienced investors is to remove those investors who deposited their ﬁrst
portfolio. These individuals could not have been new to the stock market when they
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Table 9: Panel regression estimates: Additional results
There are ﬁve regressions measuring performance in the panel all based on Model V in Table 8. Model VI and VII substitute for the
dependent variable with the total return excluding fees and the passive return. Model VIII is speciﬁed for the subset of investors active
at sample-end. Model IX excludes the investors who deposited stocks as they entered the sample, and Model X are the investors who
entered the sample in February 2000 or earlier.
Model name
VI            
Costless
VII           
Passive
VIII        
Survivors
IX            
New




Excluding    
fees










16,831 16,831 13,917 11,416 2,218




-0.533        
(0.613)
-0.481       
(0.617)
-0.729       
(0.605)
-0.799
*            
(0.445)
-0.929       
(0.588)
Turnoveri -0.761      
(0.580)
-0.174       
(0.180)
-2.181
***        
(0.782)
-1.902        
(1.280)
-1.261




0.149        
(0.142)
0.058       
(0.126)
0.511
**         
(0.247)
0.544        
(0.417)
0.264




0.049         
(0.086)
0.030         
(0.086)
0.159
*          
(0.088)
0.037         
(0.147)





**        
(0.041)
0.082
**       
(0.041)
0.083
*       
(0.044)
0.066
**        
(0.032)
0.080
***       
(0.021)
B 0
Average     
Beta
1.444
***           
(0.063)
1.449
***           
(0.062)
1.444
***           
(0.060)
1.287
***           
(0.043)
1.329
***           
(0.064)
Log Agei -0.099
**        
(0.031)
-0.100
***        
(0.035)
-0.101
***        
(0.025)
-0.165
***        
(0.051)
-0.245
**        
(0.096)
Femalei -0.028
*        
(0.015)
-0.029
*        
(0.015)
-0.027        
(0.017)
-0.058
**        
(0.023)
-0.035        
(0.031)
Turnoveri -0.179
***        
(0.039)
-0.093
***        
(0.034)
-0.178
***        
(0.054)
0.068         
(0.106)
-0.170





***        
(0.007)
-0.038
***        
(0.007)
-0.035
***        
(0.007)
-0.011
***        
(0.004)
-0.014





***       
(0.682)
2.299
***        
(0.676)
2.190
***       
(0.626)
1.643
***       
(0.589)
1.875
**       
(0.911)
Long m.   
short bondt-1
0.247
**     
(0.111)
0.241
**     
(0.112)
0.254
**       
(0.112)
0.090         
(0.111)
0.093        
(0.149)
Short               
ratet-1
5.160
***      
(1.889)
4.839
**     
(1.900)
5.169
***   
(1.881)
1.794        
(1.666)
3.439        
(2.222)
Adjusted         
R
2 0.310 0.311 0.327 0.303 0.275
for the average beta is  B 0=1.
Group   
of       
coeffi-   
cients
Newey and West (1987) standard errors, robust with respect to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, are given in paren-















became investors at this brokerage ﬁrm. Model IX in Table 9 marked “New” reports
the performance for those 11,416 investors who bought their ﬁrst portfolio. The mean
performance for this group is about 80 basis points, which is 6 basis points lower than the
sample average. This is a small difference, which is also insigniﬁcant when modelled as
a ﬁxed effect in the total sample.
It would be interesting to discover whether those who entered the market early per-
formed better than those who came in late. It is difﬁcult to partition the sample into a
“bull” and a “bear” market, because there are too few observations during the ﬁrst part
in order to enable any reasonable estimates. In addition, it may not be of much interest
to ﬁnd that some investors experienced high gains during the sharp upturn. There is
considerable idiosyncratic noise, making it difﬁcult to conclude if investors were market
timers or simply lucky. But if these investors were clever enough to time the market in
the upturn, one might also claim that they should have been able to perform better in
the downturn. Model X takes the 2,218 “Early” investors who were active in the sample
before March 2000 and measure the performance of this group alone. The mean per-
formance of this group is actually much lower than for the whole sample. Since these
investors lose 93 basis points on average, compared to 74 for the whole sample, there is
no evidence that early investors perform better on average.
4.2.3 Robustness
As an additional test, the same regression model is applied to the 3,367 investors sorted
into the highest and lowest quintiles by portfolio size, turnover and diversiﬁcation. This
speciﬁcation is more demanding, as the regression coefﬁcients now describe the variation
within groups rather than across quintiles as in the full sample case. A crude measure
of the effect between quintiles is now found in the overall means of the regressions. The
results are reported in Table 10.
The average intercepts and betas all conﬁrm the effects that were measured in the
overall sample. The investors in the largest portfolio size quintile outperform the smallest
by 26 basis points. Similarly, those with the lowest turnover gain 30 basis points more
than those who trade the most on average, and those with many stocks in their portfolio
gain 36 basis points more than the least diversiﬁed investors. The average beta for the
investors with the largest portfolios is lower than for for those with the smallest. This
suggests that there is a difference in average beta risk between these groups, even though
it was not signiﬁcant for the whole sample.
The parameter estimates for the intercept terms broadly conﬁrm that the previous
conclusions hold for the larger portfolios. This is important, because it conﬁrms that the
previously reported results are not driven by the many small-sized accounts in data, but
are also a valid characterization of those with large portfolios.
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Table 10: Panel regression estimates: Investors sorted into top and bottom quintiles
The six regressions are conducted on the ﬁrst and ﬁfth quintile for portfolio size, turnover and diversiﬁcation. The dependent variable
is total return, and each quintile contains around 3,366 investors. The parameters for turnover and number of stocks are excluded for


















-0.830       
(0.800)
-0.570       
(0.515)
-0.706       
(0.731)
-1.074
*         
(0.641)
-0.890       
(0.847)
-0.528       
(0.460)
Turnoveri -1.934       
(1.441)
-1.113
**        
(0.497)
n/a -0.757
**        
(0.343)
2.588      
(1.895)
-1.876




1.049      
(1.196)
0.205
*       
(0.110)
n/a 0.192
**   
(0.097)
-0.691       
(0.621)
0.349
***       
(0.124)
Log port-    
folio sizei
0.101      
(0.417)
-0.072       
(0.124)
0.180        
(0.207)
0.195
*     
(0.102)
0.135        
(0.206)
0.111




0.098       
(0.192)
0.084
***      
(0.030)
0.109        
(0.091)
0.015        
(0.036)
n/a 0.048
**    
(0.020)
B 0
Average         
Beta
1.584
***        
(0.084)
1.360
***        
(0.057)
1.452
***        
(0.057)
1.353
***        
(0.071)
1.645
***        
(0.083)
1.277
***        
(0.049)
Log Agei 0.008        
(0.046)
-0.172
***       
(0.061)
-0.061       
(0.038)
-0.130       
(0.087)
-0.140
***       
(0.029)
-0.104
***       
(0.028)
Femalei 0.008        
(0.018)
-0.077
***       
(0.015)
-0.037       
(0.025)
-0.012       
(0.025)
-0.012       
(0.018)
-0.047
***       
(0.016)
Turnoveri -0.391
***       
(0.080)
-0.156
***       
(0.031)
n/a -0.251
***       
(0.021)
-0.106       
(0.078)
-0.130





***       
(0.026)
-0.024
***       
(0.005)
-0.061
***       
(0.018)
-0.014
**        
(0.006)
n/a -0.015





***   
(0.846)
1.564
**   
(0.624)
2.133
***   
(0.543)
2.163
**       
(0.879)
2.815
***       
(0.787)
1.892
***       
(0.539)
Long m.    
short bondt-1
0.438
***   
(0.117)
0.150        
(0.110)
0.220
*       
(0.133)
0.293
**   
(0.132)
0.366
**   
(0.149)
0.136        
(0.091)
Short               
ratet-1
6.848
*     
(3.604)
4.472
***   
(1.557)
3.546
*     
(2.067)
7.781
***      
(2.208)
5.707
**   
(2.513)
3.882
***   
(1.481)
Adjusted         
R
2 0.272 0.378 0.267 0.266 0.237 0.472
Group   
of       




Newey and West (1987) standard errors, robust with respect to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, are given in parentheses.
average beta is  B 0=1.













The regression for the small portfolios is much noisier, and therefore many of the
parametersareinsigniﬁcant. Thisisalsotrueforturnoveranddiversiﬁcation, asinvestors
are, on average, small in these quintiles as well. In these two last cases, parameters are
excluded due to the problem of collinearity. There is little or no variation in turnover and
diversiﬁcation for the lowest quintiles, making these variables impossible to distinguish
from their average intercept and beta coefﬁcients.
Turnover has generally a negative effect on performance, except for investors who are
least diversiﬁed. The coefﬁcients here switch signs, and indicate a strong positive effect.
This ﬁnding supports a learning behavior where some investors choose to diversify as
they become aware of their unproﬁtable strategy. It could also be that some of these
investors simply beneﬁted from selling their stock. Due to the weak signiﬁcance of this
result, the only conclusive evidence is that trading does not harm the least diversiﬁed
investors to the same extent as the other investor groups.
In conclusion, the general results broadly hold when partitioning the sample into in-
vestor groups, and the regression means reveal important differences between them. The
parameters in the top quintiles for each group also indicate signiﬁcant variation within
the studied investor groups.
5 Conclusion
Investor performance can be attributed to several, partly interacting, investor characteris-
tics. The discovered systematic pattern of investor performance deepens our knowledge
of the trading behavior of online investors in general, and the relation between perfor-
mance and characteristics in particular.
Online investors trade aggressively in small portfolios, which means that the commis-
sions they pay are high even if fees are low in absolute terms. The average investor ﬂips
her portfolio twice a year, and the 20% who trade the most do so on average seven times a
year. The marginal effects of turnover reveal that investors who do not trade gain around
25 basis points more per month than the average investor. But trading is not equally as
harmful for those with larger portfolios. Portfolios that are twice the size of the sample
average gain 15 basis points per month in performance. The combined effects of turnover
and portfolio size are mainly related to fees, as they are insigniﬁcant when trading is
costless.
The novel ﬁnding in this study is that undiversiﬁed investors systematically choose
underperforming stocks in any given industry, and thus the degree of diversiﬁcation is
also important in explaining cross-sectional differences in performance. The quintile of
investors who are best diversiﬁed earn 36 basis points per month more than those who
are least diversiﬁed. The panel regressions conﬁrm that diversiﬁcation has a separate
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and distinct effect that is unrelated to portfolio size. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggest
that mutual fund investors diversify naively over available assets. I ﬁnd that it is the
overall lack of diversiﬁcation among equity investors that can be linked to performance.
Undiversiﬁed investors are overconﬁdent in their own stock-picking ability, because they
are shown to take higher risks and underperform more. The choice of stocks could be
explained by a naive strategy based on availability in the way proposed by Barber and
Odean (2003). Undiversiﬁed investors show a clear preference for attention-grabbing
technology stocks.
I propose that the explanation for the positive effect of diversiﬁcation on performance
lies in the degree of investor sophistication. Unsophisticated investors are more inclined
to follow heuristics than common advice. It is tempting to conclude that individuals
investing in one stock rather than a mutual fund are widely unaware of the most basic
textbook advice on portfolio diversiﬁcation. But we need to interpret with care, because
they might have other holdings of ﬁnancial assets than those observed in the sample.
Therefore, this explanation is only speculative. On the other hand—if there are other
stock holdings—the observed portfolio in this sample must contribute to the investor’s
overall utility in some way. I argue that this is possible, but unlikely.
First, the observed portfolio could provide necessary negative correlation to some
other assets held so as to offset overall risk in the aggregate portfolio. I ﬁnd this unlikely,
considering that the stocks held are primarily high-beta, technology stocks. Second, in-
vestors may be constrained by being unable to borrow the funds needed to obtain the
desired level of risk. This, I believe, is also unlikely. There are well-diversiﬁed mutual
funds that track most industries, and that would serve as a low-cost alternative to these
individual stocks. Third, investors might simply enjoy gambling, betting on single stocks
for the sheer fun of it. Such motives are hard to reject, but they do not explain why these
investors are less successful than others in selecting stocks.
An interesting question for future research is to understand how stock holdings relate
to other investor characteristics, such as total wealth, occupation and education. Such
variables are also likely to be useful proxies for investor sophistication, and in turn, the
proﬁtability of investment strategies.
In summary, most online investors behave contrary to conventional wisdom: They
put all their eggs in one basket and count their chickens before they are hatched. Online
investors showed guts in taking risks, but few gloried in it.
35i
i








Let xn,i,t be the number of shares of a stock n held by the individual i at the end of month
t. A transaction d during month t is denoted by xn,i,d, and super-indices B and S indicate




we also need the closing price for stock n on the last day of month t, which is labelled pC
n,t.
The stock position for individual i at the end of month t is











which is the position at the beginning of month t plus the sum of buys and sells during
the month, hereafter net purchases for short. In what follows, we will impose the restric-
tion that xn,i,t ≥ 0, meaning that investors are not allowed to have outstanding negative
positions at month-end.
A.1 Payoffs
Trading, position and total payoffs for each stock and individual are as follows. The
position payoff is deﬁned as
Π
P





which is simply the position at the beginning of the month times the change in price. The






























The ﬁrst and second component of (A3) states the net sales revenue of stock n during
month t, which is the value of sells minus buys at actual transacted prices. This value
needs to be adjusted if the number of stocks sold exceeds sales, or vice versa. The third
component of (A3) adjusts payoffs by the value of net purchases. There are two cases.
If net purchases is positive, the payoff is adjusted by multiplying the net increase in the
number of shares by the price at the end of the month. If sales exceed buys, there will
be stocks included in the trading payoff by (A3) that are already accounted for by (A2).
Therefore, the value of these shares at t is deducted from the trading payoff.22
Deposits of stocks are assumed to be transacted at the beginning of the month and
22ThemethodappliedisthereforerelatedtothatofLinnainmaa(2003), whoinvestigatetheproﬁtabilityof
daytrades. The main difference here is that payoffs for positions are invariant to which stocks are actually











redemptionsattheend. Therefore, xn,i,t−1 alsoincludesalldepositsofstocksmadeduring
the month. This is the most convenient way to include deposits since they cannot be
regarded as traded stocks. It would be a mistake not to include redemptions and deposits
as there would be at least some individuals who deposit their portfolio, but do not trade.
Investors are allowed to short-sell their stock with these deﬁnitions because the sum-
mation is invariant to the ordering of purchases and sales. The restriction only means that
there must be a positive holding of each stock at the end of the month.23






To ﬁnd the payoff for the whole portfolio, we sum over n to obtain total portfolio
















The task is to measure investors’ ability to create value in their portfolios over a ﬁxed
time frame while accounting for trading. The key issue is to identify the capital tied to the
payoff components at the portfolio level. The deﬁnition of trading capital is complicated
by the fact that investors who trade extensively may turn around their portfolio many
times per month. For instance, an investor may sell her complete holdings of one stock
and invest in another during the month. The capital required for the initial holding and
the trading capital needed for the purchase is one and the same.
To facilitate comparisons, we assume here that investors hold unleveraged portfolios.
They are unconstrained in that they can borrow cash freely to cover the cost of any net
purchases at the portfolio level. In this case, the capital required for trading is the mini-
mum amount of money needed to ﬁnance the portfolio.
Similar to payoffs, we distinguish between position and trading capital as follows.












which is simply the value of all stocks in the portfolio at the beginning of the month.
The amount of capital engaged in trading is determined in two steps. I begin by
matching purchases and sales. For each investor, the trades are sorted on a stock by
23In the sample, this proved to be a minor problem as there were only 34 instances where it was needed
to cover open short positions at month’s end. This was done by dating the corresponding buy transaction
at the beginning of the following month, t + 1, as belonging to t.
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stock basis in calendar time. Buy transactions are assumed to precede sales. This is to
ensure that the investor does not borrow any stocks in the portfolio.




i,d if J = S
−pi,d · xJ
i,d if J = B
)
,
such that it represents the revenue of any sales and cost of any purchase independent of
the stock that is traded. We then seek the lowest cost that is needed to ﬁnance the trading
activity during the month. The trade values are ordered during the month from begin-
ning to end for each investor regardless of which stock is traded, and the cash balance
is calculated at each point in time. The lowest cumulative cash balance in month t is the











and is expressed as a positive number since we pick out the largest negative cash balance.






Therefore, the capital base is only increased if trading incurs additional funding. But
this is exactly what we want, because the investor who reallocates her investment without
using additional funds will have the same capital base.
A.3 Simple returns



















which is the weighted return of the portfolio held in t−1, and where wn,i,t−1 is the weight
of stock n held by individual i in t − 1.
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The obvious problem when constructing returns from the deﬁnitions above is that no
account is taken of any alternative return on funds that is not invested in the market. For
example, consider an investor who buys stocks at the end of the month. This portfolio
will have a capital base that reﬂects the value of the additional purchases at the beginning
of the month, but a stock return measured over a much shorter horizon.
This effect is mitigated by measuring excess returns, created as follows. It is assumed
that the investor borrows at the available 30-day T-bill rate, rF
t−1, in order to ﬁnance the
portfolio. The interest that is attributable to the position component, IP
i,t, is calculated as
the cost of borrowing the value of the portfolio at the beginning of the month, i.e the ﬁrst
part of equation (A8).
If trading occurs, we seek the net interest paid for trading capital during the month.
Interest is calculated for each transaction and summed over the month creating the ﬁcti-
tious revenue IT
i,t that corresponds to the interest that is attributable to the actual timing
of purchases and sales.24











i,t is always 0 or negative and IT
i,t is negative if there is a net cost of ﬁnancing
the monthly transactions. When trading capital is 0 but the investor is net selling, IT
i,t
represents the interest earned on investments that is sold out of the portfolio. In this way,
timing of the sale is properly accounted for since positive interest is added to the return
measure. Both trading capital and IT
i,t can be positive if the investor only draws cash for
a short time and for a small amount in comparison to sales revenues in a month.
The interest on trading capital is only added to the capital base if it is negative. This
is because it is assumed that interest earned is paid out at the end of the month, but any
costs must be covered by capital at the beginning of the month. It therefore ensures that
returns are bounded at -1.
In the case of no trading, IT







= ri,t − r
F
t−1.












The idea of comparing investor performance with their own-benchmark was originally
proposed by Grinblatt and Titman (1993). Here, the passive return captures the same









which is the position payoff divided by total capital corrected for interest. As the own-
benchmark return measures the return of the portfolio since there was no trading during




The passive return measure uses total capital as a base. It is therefore assumed that
whatever funds are used for net investments during the month are invested at the risk-
free rate. The investors can only deviate from the benchmark by trading. During the
month, investors can move in and out of the market as a whole or switch allocation be-
tweenstocks. Ifthesetacticalchangesinriskandreallocationsareproﬁtable, theinvestors
earn a higher excess return on the traded portfolio than on the static own-benchmark.
A.6 Industry returns
The industry weight in industry v for individual i at time t − 1 , wv,i,t−1, is obtained by





Thus, the investor’s industry tracking return is the industry weight multiplied by the








v,t · wv,i,t−1. (A13)
A.7 Turnover






Turnover therefore includes both position and trading capital in the denominator. To-
tal capital is doubled so we can interpret the measure as how often a portfolio is bought
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and purchased in a month. A turnover measure of one thus implies that the whole port-
folio is sold and purchased.
A.8 Concluding example
The calculation of the various returns deﬁned above is illustrated in Table 11 by two
simpliﬁed examples of two investors holding or trading two different stocks.
Paul initially holds 50 A stocks and 100 B stocks at prices 90 and 50, respectively. He
makes one trade during the month, which is an additional purchase of 100 stock A at
price 92. At the end of the month, the stock prices are 100 for A and 45 for B. The total
payoff for A is 1,300, of which 500 is attributable to the position and 800 to trading. Since
there was no trading in B, trading payoff is 0, but there is a position payoff of -500. Total
payoff is therefore 800.
The position capital needed to ﬁnance this portfolio is 4,500 for A and 5,000 for B, i.e.,
9,500 in total. Furthermore, the additional stocks A bought cost 9,200. Since there are no
more trades, this is the lowest cash balance during the month. Therefore, trading capital
and total capital sums up to 18,700. All in all, this yields a total portfolio return of 4.28%.
The passive return, given by the return on the portfolio held in t − 1, is 0%. Turnover,
which is the value of the purchases divided by two times total capital, is almost 25%,
indicating that this month Paul bought and sold a quarter of his portfolio.
The other investor—Magnus—starts out with 100 A stocks and makes three trades.
The ordering of the trades are marked by super-indices. He begins by buying 50 B stocks
to price 45. Later, he sells 140 A stocks (such that in effect he short-sells 40 A stocks) at
price 85. Finally, he decides to buy back 100 A stocks at price 95.
Magnus generates a trading payoff of 250 in B as the stocks that were bought at 40 are
each worth 45 at month-end. The trading payoff for A is calculated as follows. The value
of sales minus purchases is 2,680 and is adjusted by 40 stocks valued at 100, such that the
trading payoff is -1,320 in all. A position payoff of 1,000 is recorded for the stocks owned
at the beginning of the month and held to the end, such that the total payoff for A is -320.
We can convince ourselves that this is indeed correct by noting that the monthly mean
purchasing price of A stocks is 92.50. Magnus owned 100 A shares that were worth 90
at the beginning of the month, and 100 shares was bought at 95. Magnus incurred a loss
of 770 when 140 shares were sold at 87, but gained on the remaining 60 stocks that were
kept to month-end. The 7.50 proﬁt on each of these 60 shares amounts to 450. Losses and
proﬁts come to -320.
Position capital is deﬁned by the value of the holdings, which in this case is 100 A
stocks to the value of 9,000. We retrieve the trading capital by considering the order of
the trades. The lowest value we obtain summing over the trades is 2,000, which is needed
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Table 11: Two examples of return measure
The return measure is illustrated by two examples reﬂecting a one-month investment history of two investors. The monthly t−1 and
t closing prices are 90 and 100 for stock A and 50 and 45 for stock B. The order for which the trades occur are marked by super-indices.
Paul holds 50 units of A and 100 of B. He then buys 100 more A at price 92. Magnus holds 100 A stocks. Then 50 units of B are
purchased at price 40, followed by 140 A sold at 87. Finally 100 A stocks are bought at price 95. For simplicity, the returns here are
simple rather than excess returns used in the actual calculations.
Assumptions Stock A Stock A
Closing price in t-1,  p
C
n,t-1 90 50 90 50
Closing price in t, p
C
n,t 100 45 100 45
Initial position, x n,i,d 50 100 100 0
Amount bought, x
B
n,i,d 100¹ 0 100³ 50¹
Price bought,  p
B
n,i,d 92 - 95 40
Amount sold,  x
S
n,i,d 0 0 140² 0
Price sold,  p
S




n,i 800 0 -1,320 250
Position payoff, Π
P
n,i 500 -500 1,000 0








Total capital, C i,t 18,700 11,000
Returns





*) Any resemblance to actual persons or events are unintentional and purely coincidental.
Paul
*         Magnus
*
Stock B Stock B
to ﬁnance the ﬁrst transaction.25 Trading capital is therefore 2,000. Total capital is 11,000
which corresponds to the initial holding of 100 A stocks at price 90 plus the 50 B stocks
bought at price 40.
All in all, dividing payoffs by capital, Magnus total portfolio return is -0.64%. The
own-benchmark return is 9.09%, which is the return on the 100 A stocks held at the be-
ginning of the period. The turnover is measured at 108%, which means that this month
Magnus bought and sold more than the value of his portfolio.
This is a simpliﬁed example where any interest with respect to the timing of the trades
are unaccounted for in the return measure. The corresponding excess returns to those
here could be created by the adjustments given previously in the text.
25The cash balance for the second trade is 10,180, obtained by adding the 12,180 in revenue for the sales
to -2,000. For the third trade, the cash balance is 680.
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Appendix B: GMM estimation
The regressions of the portfolio excess return for each investor i at time t can generally be
speciﬁed as follows:















where the A:s and B:s are true regression parameters, c denotes J investor characteristics,
z denotes K conditional risk attributes, and ε denotes the error term. In this general form,
both the characteristics and attributes can vary over time and between individuals. In all,
we have 2 + J + K parameters and i = 1,...,N individual portfolio observations over
time t = 1,...,T.
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where Xt summarizes the data and θ contains all parameters. There are 2+J +K param-
eters and (2 + J + K)N moment conditions, so the system is over-identiﬁed. We recover











where A is a matrix of constants. More speciﬁcally, we let A be of the following form
A =

   

11×N 01×N 01×JN 01×KN
01×N 11×N 01×JN 01×KN
0J×N 0J×N IJ×J ⊗ 11×N 0J×KN
0K×N 0K×N 0K×JN IK×K ⊗ 11×N

   

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
= 01×(2+J+K). (B3)
Hence, the system of moment conditions in (B3) is exactly identiﬁed. It is straightforward
to show that these moment conditions correspond exactly to a least square estimator of
(B1).
Hansen (1982) shows that the asymptotic distribution of the parameter estimates θT of
the true parameter vector θ0 is given by
√
T (θT−θ0)



















and D0 is the gradient of the moment conditions for the true parameters. The gradient
is estimated from its sample counterpart and the sample variance-covariance matrix is



















implying loss of efﬁciency when the matrix A is constructed arbitrarily, as is the case
here. However, the standard errors in (B4) are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation.
When investors enter the sample at different points in time, there are missing obser-
vations for the months in which they are not observable. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000)
44i
i







derive results that are used to estimate pooled models with missing data, i.e., construct-
ing a balanced panel from an unbalanced one. They deﬁne indicator variables based on





1 if data are observed at t for individual i
0 if data are not observed at t for individual i
The critical assumption they make is that the indicator variable is independent of εi,t
which implies that the data are missing randomly. When this is the case, we can form
moment conditions based on the product of the previously modelled errors and the indi-
cator variable. This implies that, for all practical purposes, we can use the same estima-
tion approach proposed earlier on the full sample by treating missing observations in the
moment conditions as zeros. See Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) for an example.
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